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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Tll~~ S'r.\'rE <>~, UT .. \H, 
Pl ai uti.tJ-Respo1ul en f, 
_,·~.-
HOB 1·: Irr l) 11 ~ L~\ XE\~, 
J)e fc 11d a11 t- .L.t }J lJell a·JI t. 
Case 
No. 10073 
BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT 
~T.\TE:\LE~T OF THE N .. \TURE OF CASE 
Thl' appellant, Robert Delaney, has appealed from 
his ron,·ietion upon jury trial of the crime of negligent 
homiride, 41-6-43.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, in the 
Fifth .T udicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
the Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
.\fter full jury trial on the information, the appel-
lant "·a~ convicted of the misdemeanor of negligent 
homicide and sentenced to 60 days confinement in the 
Iron County Jail. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the points urged by 
the appellant do not warrant any other action by this 
court than affirmance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees with some of the facts set 
forth in appellant's brief, but submits the following 
statement of facts as being more in keeping with the 
rule on appeal that the evidence will be viewed in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
Shortly after midnight, in the early morning of 
March 2nd, 1963, the defendant drove himself, Christine 
Lambert, Michael J. Higbee and Diana :\!iller up Cedar 
Canyon on Highway 14 in Iron County (T. 5, 8, 146). 
Christine Lambert \Yas 17 years old at the time and 
appellant was 19 (T. 471). Prior to the journey up the 
canyon, the appellant had consumed four cans of beer 
(T. 473-475) and possibly more (T. 338). Appellant had 
been at a social gathering where beer and hard liquor 
\vere available (T. 510). Although appellant did notre-
member, he had danced while at the gathering (T. 510). 
As the journey up Cedar Canyon started, appellant 
was driving, Christine Lambert \Yas sitting in the front 
seat of the car next to appellant, and Mr. Higbee and ~Iiss 
Miller were sitting in the rear of the vehicle (T. 151). 
2\fr. Higbee had some beer in the car at the time they 
left (T. 152, 382, 516). 
As they started out, appellant accelerated at a very 
fast rate of speed and although appellant denied running 
2 
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a stop sif-,'11, Iliana :\Iiller testified that he failed to stop 
nt n ~ign and ut that time ,,·as going very fast, which fright-
l'llPd ht·r (T. :~7~, 383). She testified that although she 
did not notier anything unusual as they drove up the can-
yon. shP liked fal4t driYing and would not be concerned 
nt PX<'t'l4~iYe speed (rr. 386). During the trip up the can-
yon, tlu· }l'u'ties ,,·ere talking and playing a record 
playt·r in tht• ear (T. ~7:3-27D, :377). The posted speed 
limit in the ('anyon is 50 miles per hour (T. 68), and 
frit•nds of the appellant estimated his speed "\Yell in f'X-
l'P~s of .)0 miles per hour. A. B. Hatch, "\Yho passed 
nppPllnnt 's ra r as it came up the canyon, estimated the 
~IH'l'd at 70 mih·s per hour (T. 317) as did Sylvia Gale 
\ T. :~~:>). Oa ry C. ~Inrkclprang, who "\Yas in a Yrhicle 
follfnring- appellant, estimated appellant's speed as high 
&lS 70 milPs per hour and indicated that he had some con-
('Prn during the trip up the canyon (T. 329). Delane~~ 
himself estimated his speed as between 60 to 65 miles 
per hour (T. 484). The canyon road is a winding, curv-
ing, ele,·nted road (T. 64, 94, 186) . 
.. \ t a point up the canyon, the Delaney vehicle over-
turnetl, rPsulting in the almost instant death of Chris-
tine Lambert (T. 6, 31, 52). The vehicle came to a rest on 
it~ top ('r. 6). The high,vay patrol measured 707 feet 
of the radius of scuff and skid marks left by the appel-
lant'~ vehicle before coming to rest (T. 67, 31-32). The 
Yehirle traYeled across the center lines into the embank-
ment and back onto the road. From the measurement, the 
~lWt)tl of the Yehicle at the time of the accident (mini-
mum speed) \\~as estimated at 99.9 to 101 miles per hour 
3 
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(T. 252, 253). The appellant indicated that he did not 
apply his brakes ( T. 505) and further testified he had 
been talking to his rear-seat passenger at the time of the 
accident (T. 485). 
Immediately after the accident, upon being ques-
tioned by Officer John R. Williams, appellant stated as 
to what happened, ''I guess we were racing a little.'' 
(T. 6) Further the appellant consistently said with ref-
erence to the dead girl, ''I killed, I killed her. '' ( T. 7, 
13, 288) Immediately after the accident, a car driven 
by Mel Clark, a friend of the appellant, arrived at the 
accident, skidding against a guard rail to stop ( T. 431, 
328-339). 
The appellant's automobile was a 1961 Chevrolet 
two-door, designed as a racing vehicle, although it was 
a stock car capable of being purchased on the open mar-
ket ( T. 165, 166). The vehicle contained a 350 h.p. en-
gine, four-speed transmission, and racing brakes (T. 
165-166). The car had a heavy duty suspension which 
'vould normally allow it to take curves better (T. 166). 
In drag racing, with some mechanical changes, the ap-
pellant's car had been recorded to accelerate from a 
stop to 96 miles per hour 1 within a quarter of a mile 
(T. 167). It was estimated that the car was capable of 
speeds of 135 to 140 miles per hour (T. 168), and the 
appellant admitted that the car could probably do 120 
miles per hour without being fixed up in prime racing 
shape (T. 492). 
1 99 miles per hour at one time (T. 167). 
4 
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]~asl'd upon the abovp evidence, characterized most 
favorably to the vPrdict, the jury convicted the appellant 
ot" tlu.· <·rime charged. Other facts relevant to the spe-
rifir issues raised on appeal are set out under the points 
in argument. The respondent agrees with the appel-
);tnt that the trial, covering some four days, must be 
upproarhPd as to factual sufficiency from a view of the 
whole rerord eovering some 534 pages of transcript. 
\\ .. hrn so ,.iP\\·rd, it is submitted that a fair verdict "~as 
n·turned and no basis for reversal exists. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TilE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EVIDENCE 
.AXY BIAS OR PREJUDICE BY ASKING 
QUESTIONS OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS 
\YI-IICH WERE MERELY FOR CLARIFICA-
TION 1\ND AN AID AT ASCERTAINING 
TilE TRUTH AND UNDERSTANDING THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The appellant argues that the trial judge deprived 
the appellant of a fair trial by interrogating a witness 
for the state and thus evidencing a bias and prejudice 
tow·ard the appellant. The conduct which the appellant 
claims prejudiced him occurred after all the state's evi-
dence had been presented and after most of the indepen-
dent evidence of the defense had been received. During 
t.he course of the state's evidence, Officer William Burch 
of the High,,·ay Patrol was called as a witness ( T. 22). He 
tPstified as to physic.al evidence at the accident scene (T. 
~7), the position of the appellant's vehicle (T. 27), and the 
coursl) and path that the vehicle followed, which he said 
5 
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could be clearly followed ( T. 28). He testified as to 
measurements he made with respect to the vehic·le 's path 
( T. 31, 32, 34). A diagram of the path of the vehicle was 
made by Officer Burch on the courtroom blackboard (Ex-
hibit D-1). Officer Burch's testimony, along 'Yith thnt of 
Guy D. Neilson of the State High"Tay Department (T. 
177, etc.), provided a basis for a hypothetical queRtion 
to an expert who placed the appellant's speed at 99.9 to 
101 miles per hour, at the minimum, at the time of the 
accident (T. 252). 
The appellant was agreeable to a view of the acci-
dent scene ( T. 441, 443). The court admonished the jnry 
twice that they were not to engage in any unauthorized 
communication ( T. 445, 446). Thereafter, the sheriff, 
counsel, the accused and the jury went to the scene of 
the accident. Officer Burch was also present with the 
reporter ( T. 44 7). The court asked Officer Burch to point 
out the landmarks and physical features to which he had 
previously testified in court. Not one of the questions 
in any ''Tay reflected any bias or prejudice on the part of 
the trial judge ( T. 44 7-460). Appellant in no 'vay points 
out any question or series of questions 'Yhich could be 
said to evidence any bias or prejudice or be unfairly 
couched toward the prosecution. No objection, bas~d on 
a claim of bias or prejudice of the trial court, 'Yas ever 
raised below. In addition, the appellant's counsel asked 
some questions of the witness (T. 453, 454, 456, 457, 458). 
The only action of the court during the course of the trial 
which the appellant complains indicates prejudice (Brief 
p. 16) was an admonition to the appellant not to volun-
6 
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tet•r 'vht'l'P an ans\ver he ga , .. c in response to a prosecu-
tion qtu'stion \Vas non-responsive (T. 491). This did not 
orrnr during the vie\Y and was proper 'vhere the witness 
\vas going- afield. In contrast to the appellant's conten-
tion, the rP<'ord sho\\'S the court attempted to protect the 
nppellant from prejudice at one point in the trial by 
rt•st rirting the prosecution from going into a description 
of thP gruesome scene at the accident, where it 'vas repe-
titious ( T. 39). In a deli tion, the court sustained clef ense 
motions to strike (T. 180) and excluded the results of 
nppellant's blood test, apparently because of a claimed 
t'nilnrP of chain of custody. This ruling was extremely 
fa\·orable to the appellant and \vas a Yery severe inter-
pretation of the chain of custody requirements. Nirhols 
r . .llcC'oy, ;jH Cal. 2d 447, 240 P. 2d 569; Wharton's Cri?n-
iual f.'ridrucr, Vol. 2, p. 509, etc. (T. 207, etc.) These 
facts. \\·hen vie"""ed against the whole record, and the ac-
commodating sentence imposed (R. 40-43) clearly refute 
a elaim that the trial judge was in any way biased or 
prejudiced, or that his questions to Officer Burch, which 
Wl'rl' for the purposes of clarifying the evidence (T. 456, 
Line:>), in any \Yay unfairly treated the appellant. Addi-
tionally, after returning from the accident scene, the 
court sua sponte instructed the jury (T. 461): 
''THE CouRT : The record should show that 
the defendant is present with his attorney and the 
Jury is in the box. I believe the record should 
sho'' further that \ve haYe now returned to the 
Courtroom from our excursion up Cedar Canyon, 
or I guess it is Cedar Canyon, isn't it, Gentle-
men~ ... \ny,vay, the canyon east of Cedar, in any 
event, to view the scene of the accident with 'vhich 
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've are here concerned. Ladies and Gentlemen of 
the Jury, so there will be no misunderstanding, 
while we were at the scene of the accident for the 
purpose of providing you with a view of this acci-
dent scene, and not with any idea of intention of 
persuading your minds one way or the other by 
the Court and by that I mean the Judge, myself, 
attempted to with the assistance of Officer Burch 
to elicit information as to the points which are -
some of them being indicated on the chalk outline 
on our blackboard there. I would want you to 
have no idea that the Court was in any manner 
attempting to influence your thinking or your 
view of the situation in any particular. What I 
would think about this case as to the facts is 
entirely immaterial. It is your decision and your 
decision alone which will govern as to the factual 
situation. I would want you to have no idea that 
I was attempting to either persuade you one way 
or the other, for or against the State or the de-
fendant or in anywise by my questions or by my 
attempts to assist Officer Burch in pointing these 
items out to you. I want to make that very clear 
to you that in no way was I attempting to in-
fluence you at any point in our excursion up 
there, nor during the course of the trial, because 
you are the triers of the facts.'' 
It should also be noted that no motion for mistrial was 
made at the time of the viewing, nor did the appellant's 
motion for new trial cite the present claim as a basis 
for new trial (R. 38). 
The general rule as to the power and duty of the 
trial court to examine witnesses or call for evidence is 
stated in Abbott, Criminal Tri.al Practice, § 323: 
''The judge may in his discretion interpose 
of his own motion to call out legal evidence by 
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interrogating a witness under examination, or to 
call a '"itness who should be called by the prosecu-
tion. But it is error in so doing to express opin-
ions prejudicial to the accused or indicate to the 
jury his opinion as to the merits of the case 
of the credibility or weight of the evidence.'' 
It is not a basis to complain that the trial court's 
examination is extended unless it becomes overbearing 
and assumes the role of an advocate. Gordon Y. I rrin c, 
105 Ga. 144, 31 S.E. 151. The court has an obligation to 
see that the evidence is fully developed or is compre-
hendible by the jury. People v. Rongetti, 331 Ill. 581, 
163 N.E. 373; TVharton' s Criminal Evidence, § 842. Gen-
erally, "'vhether or not the court shall question a 'vit-
ness and the extent of its examination are within its 
~onnd discretion." Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 842, 
p. 213. 
In State v-. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 P. 2d 222 (1935), 
a similar objection was made to that raised in the in-
~tant case. The court noted: 
d • No objection is made that the questions 
asked by the court elicited testimony that was 
incompetent, irrelevant, or immaterial, or were 
otherwise improper if such questions had been 
asked by counsel for either side. The basis of the 
objection is that the trial judge ought not to have 
examined the witnesses at all, and that in asking 
the question the judge indicated an opinion with 
respect to the credibility of the witnesses exam-
ined, or, perhaps, as to the defendant's guilt, all 
to defendant's prejudice before the jury.'' 
9 
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This court went on to find that no prejudice resulted 
from the judge's questions to several "~itnesses and 
stated: 
''The conduct of a trial is to a large extent 
under the control and within the disc.retion of thr 
trial judge who should preside \vith dignity and 
impartiality. He is more than a mere referee or 
moderator. State v. Keehn, 85 Kan. 765, 118 P. 
851. He should not express, or otherwise indicate, 
an opinion as to the credibility of the \Yitness or 
the guilt of the defendant. Such matters are ex-
clusively for the jury. The practice is well estah-
lished for the trial judge, w·ithin reasonable 
bounds, to ask questions of any ''"'itness 'vho may 
be on the stand for the purpose of eliciting the 
truth, or making clear any points that otherwise 
would remain obscure. 16 C. J. 831; People v. 
Reid, 72 Cal. App. 611, 237 P. 824. It is generally 
held that in the exercise of his right to question a 
witness, the judge should not indulge in extensive 
examination or usurp the function of counsel. 
In a criminal case he should not by form of ques-
tion or manner or extent of examination indicate 
to the jury his opinion as to the guilt of the de-
fendant or the weight or sufficiency of the evi-
dence .. Note 84 A.L.R. 1172; 28 R.C.L. 587. His 
examinations should not be extensive because it is 
a matter of much difficulty for any person to in-
dulge in an extensive examination of the witness 
without indicating a train of thought or some 
feeling with respect to the truth or falsity of the 
testimony being elicited. His attitude should at all 
times be fair and impartial so that neither by 
tone of voice, facial expression, nor manner of 
propounding a question is bias shown ,,~hich may 
prejudice the defendant's right to a fair and im-
partial trial. A trial judge is \Yithin his rights in 
asking questions for the purpose of eliciting the 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
truth or to rl0ar up an obscurity. People Y. J en-
kins, 118 Cal. App. 116, 4 P. (2d) 799. But in 
doing so, sincerity and fairness should character-
. d d t• " izP Ius every wor an ac 10n. 
rrhe <'OUrt determined that the questioning there, 
whieh i~ not far removed from that in the instant case, 
'vns not prejudicial. 
. \ similar result ""'as reached in State v. a reru, 89 
rtah 437, ~>7 P. ~tl 750 (1936). See also State Y. Kallas, 
~l7 Utah -l~l~, fl-! P. 2d 414 (1939). 
In [>('ople Y. I~igney, 55 Cal. 2d 234, 10 Cal. Rep. 623, 
359 P. ~< l 2:-3 ( 1961), the California. Supreme Court rec-
ognized the g-vneral rules set out above by the Utah court 
nnd noted: 
· • Although the judge questioned defendant 
and Doctor Brandmeyer at great length 'the mere 
fnet that the judge examined * * * at some length 
does not establish misconduct.' People v. Corri-
gan, supra., 48 Cal. 2d 551, 559, 310 P. 2d 953, 
958 ~ People v. Montgomery, supra, 47 CaL App. 
2d 1, 18, 117 P. 2d 437." 
In that ease the court noted as to the facts : 
''In the present case the trial judge, over de-
fendant's objection, examined him extensively as 
to eYents immediately preceding the shooting, 
interrupting the deputy district attorney's cross-
examination to do so. The judge questioned de-
fendant closely to clarify inconsistencies between 
his testimony on the stand and statements he had 
previously made. After defendant was excused as 
a witness and Doctor Brandmeyer was about to 
take the stand, the judge recalled defendant and 
once again questioned him as to his memory of 
the shooting. .L\.fter defendant had been excused 
11 
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a second time and before Doctor Brandmeyer's 
examination began, the parties retired to cham-
bers for a conference." [At which conference the 
judge told defense counsel he disbelieved his client, 
the accused.] 
The California Supreme Court found no impropriety 
warranting reversal. It declared: 
'' * * * A careful examination of the record con-
vinces us that the judge's questions were not a 
guise for conveying to the jury the court's dis-
belief in defendant's evidence but were asked to 
get the truth established, and that they fairly and 
impartially brought out relevant and material tes-
timony. Moreover, the judge instructed the jury 
that any intimation in his questions or the ques-
tions of counsel that certain facts were or were not 
true must be disregarded, and he adequately in-
structed them that they were the exclusive judges 
of the effect and value of the evidence.'' 
In the instant case, the court did not transmit any 
indication of his beliefs to the jury. His questioning was 
directed towards clarifying and making understandable 
the testimony as to physical evidence offered by Officer 
Burch. This is a proper action. This limited partici-
p·ation by the court, coupled with his admonition against 
drawing inferences, obviously did not result in preju-
dice. Especially is this clear from a full reading of all 
that occurred during the long trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN THE MANNER OF CONDUCTI~G 
THE VIEW OF THE SCENE OF THE CRI~IE. 
12 
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The appellant makes a scattergun attack to the effect 
that the court ('lTPd in the manner in which the vie'v of 
thP necident scene was conducted. The specific na tnre 
of the appellant's objection is not pinpointed, but gen-
prally it may be said that appellant contends that 
77-31-26. Utah Code Annotated 1953, 'vas violated. This 
sPction provides: 
''When in the opinion of the court it is proper 
that the jury should view the place in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, or in 
"~hirh any other material fact occurred, it may 
order the jury to be conducted in a body, in the 
custody of an officer, to the place, which must be 
sho,vn to them by a person appointed by the court 
for that purpose; and the officer must be sworn to 
suffer no person to speak or communicate with 
the jury, nor do so himself, on any subject con-
nected with the trial, and to return them into 
court without unnecessary delay, or at a specified 
time.'' 
The statute is directory in nature. First, it leaves 
the matter of the view in the discretion of the trial 
judge. Secondly, it requires that a person be appointed 
to act as custodian of the jury. Third, the officer 
must be sworn against unauthorized communica-
tion. In the instant case the appellant consented to the 
view· of the accident scene (T. 441, 443). No objection 
\vas raised in the trial court to the judge being present 
when the view occurred. No objection was or is made that 
the jury \vas not properly in the custody of the sheriff, 
indeed the custodian was in charge of the jury. 
13 
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Nothing in 77-31-26, U.C.A. 1953, specifies that the 
judge may not accompany the jury. It would be a diffi-
cult situation if the judge could not view the accident 
scene but was still called on to appraise the evidence 
as against motions attacking its legal sufficiency. It is 
difficult to see in \vhat manner this could in any \vay 
prejudice the accused. In State v. Glow, 215 ~finn. :180, 
10 N.W. 2d 359 (1943), the Minnesota Supreme Court 
indicated that not only was it proper for the trial court 
to allow the view, it was equally proper for him to 
point out to the jury objects at the locus in quo to better 
enable the jury to understand the testimony. ...~lthough 
the court reversed, it did so because of the failure to pro-
vide a reporter's transcript to sho\Y \Yhat actually oc-
curred. In the instant appeal, all that occurred \vas a mat-
ter of record. 
The appellant places reliance on State v. Mortensen, 
26 Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562 (1903), for the proposition that 
the court erred in accompanying the jury. There is no 
merit to appellant's contention. That case considered 
only the question of the presence of the accused, and did 
not consider the presence of the judge. rrhe court merely 
quoted from a Kansas case on the necessity of the ac-
cused's presence, which case had mentioned that under 
Kansas procedure, the judge remains in the courtroom. 
Further, since no objection to the judge being present \Yas 
voiced, the M orten.sen case would support a conclusion 
of waiver. Finally, no reasonable justification can be 
shown why the judge should not also Yie'''" the scene, nor 
ran any demonstration be made as to ho\v that factor 
14 
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could prejudice the accused. Specific prejudice must arise 
from thP YiP\V. State v. t.'-{hau·, 39 Utah 536, 205 Pac. 339 
()!)~~); 77-4~-1, l~.(~ ... \. 1953. ~\ number of cases haYe 
Pxpn'ssly rulPd that an accused has the right to have 
th(l judg-P present at the vie,ving and that his absence 
tnay hP t'ITor. ~\nno., 47 A.L.R. 2d 1227; 53 Am. Jur., 
Trial, § 446; Anno., 42 L.R.A. 381. 
Htteon(lly, the appellant seems to contend that the 
eourt ttrre(i in receiving evidence at the scene. Nothing 
in ~p(·tion 77 -:~1-26, U.C.~\. 1953, prohibits the court from 
('onducting a hearing at the scene in order to allo'v the 
jury to hettPr understand the evidence. The cases cited 
hy the appellant on the question of the po,ver or propriety 
of the trial court receiving evidence at the viewing re-
flect one line of authority. However, there is an equally 
impressive line supporting the trial court conducting a 
hea.ring at the scene. Thus, in 23 C.J.S., Cri1ninal Law, 
§ 986, p. 994, it is stated: 
''According to other authorities, ho\\~eyer, the 
purpose of the Yiew is to supply evidence, and the 
information received by taking the view consti-
tutes evidence to be considered by the jury the 
same as any other evidence introduced in the case. 
l"'"nder this theory it is proper to receive explana-
tory evidenc.e during the taking of the view.'' 
The landmark case on the conduct of a viewing from 
the standpoint of due process of la"'" is Snyder v. 1ll assa.-
chuscfts, 291 l'. S. 97 (1934). In that case the court or-
dered that the jury Yie"~ the places material to the 
charge under consideration - murder. The vie"\\ ... ing by 
15 
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the jury \Vas conducted in the presence of the judge, couu-
sel, and stenographer. The accused ""'as not present; thus, 
the case presented a more impressive situation for a 
claim of error. During the course of the Yiewing, items 
of concern and interest were c.alled to the jury's atten-
tion. The Uuited States Supreme Court found no un-
conscionable aspects surrounding the case and upheld 
the conviction. ~fr. Justice Cardozo analyzed the as pert 
of allowing comment or clarification at the scene and 
found it to be a valid procedure. He stated: 
''Obviously the difference bet,veen a Yie" .. at 
which every one is silent and a vie\Y accompanied 
by a request to note this feature or another is onP 
of degree, and nothing more. The mere bringing 
of a jury to a particular place, whether a building 
or a room or a wall "\vith a bullet hole, is in effect 
a statement that this is the place which \\ .. as the 
scene of the offense, and a request to examine it. 
When the tacit directions are made explicit, the 
defendant is not wronged unless the supplement of 
" .. ords so transforms the quality of the procedure 
that injustice \vill be done if the defendant is kept 
a\vay. 
''Statements to the jury point out the specific 
objects to be noted have been a traditional accom-
paniment of a view for about t\vo centuries, if not 
longer. The Fourteenth 1\_mendment has not dis-
placed the procedure of the ages.'' 
In State '?· llf orfensen, supra, this court found no 
error in allo"\\Ting the jury· to pace off distances and make 
measurements. Certainly, the procedure in the instant 
ra~e, being for purposes of clarification and enlighten-
16 
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ment, cannot be said to have harmed the appellant in any 
manner. Wigmore, E rid l'Hce, 3rd Ed., § 1802, p. 247, 
noteH: 
" It is, moreover, immaterial that the sho,ver 
is a party or one 'vho '"ill be an ordinary 'lvitness; 
indeed his familiarity 'vith the places is assumed 
to be a special qualification; it is only the pointing 
out by an unauthorized "ritness that is improper 
(supra, par. 2) 
'' ( 3) For the same reason, the judge may di-
rect that certain 1£itnesses repeat their testimony 
at the view. This is nothing more than an ad-
journment of the court temporarily to the place 
of view, 'vhere the holding of the court is tem-
porarily resumed.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
In Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198 S.E. 441 
(1938), the case, like the instant one, involved a death by 
automobile. The judge in effect acted as shower and had 
"·itnesses point out places and objects of concern. The 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia., in passing on the 
propriety of the Yiewing, noted the decision in Snyder v. 
Jlassachu.setts, supra, and the position of Wigmore. The 
court found no reversible error, commenting: 
"It would have been better and more in keep-
ing "·i th the general practic.e for the court to have 
placed the jury in charge of some officer familiar 
with the scene and to have authorized him to point 
out the pertinent objects with no witnesses for 
either side present. However, in this case the 
judge himself acted as an official 'shower' and per-
mitted the witnesses for plaintiff and the attor-
neys for defendants, in the presence of the judge, 
to point out to the jury objects and locations men-
17 
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tioned in the testimony previously introduced. If 
the court is authorized to select an impartial per-
son to point out pertinent objects and things, sure-
ly it is not reversible error for the judge himself 
to perform this duty. 
"We do not approve of the use of witness2s on 
a view, but inasmuch as the witnesses did not 
change their testimony in any material W'ay and it 
affirmatively appearing that the full opportunity 
was given defendants to sho'v to the jury any and 
every object and thing mentioned in the testimon:~, 
the judgment will not be reversed.'' 
It is the position of the Attorney General that this 
court is passing upon the legal issue raised by the ap-
peal without benefit of controlling stare decisis. As a con-
sequence, the court may examine not only the facts of 
this case, vvhich rather conclusively sho"r no prejudice to 
the appellant other than a fair disclosure of \Yhat al-
legedly transpired, but also the question of \Yhether or not 
the conduct herein complained of violates any policy of 
criminal jurisprudence. In State v. O'Day, 188 La. 169, 
175 So. 839 ( 1937), a situation occurred very similar to 
that complained of by the instant appeal. The opinion 
notes: 
''This Bill was taken to the ruling of the Court, 
"\vhich permitted certain \Yitnesses to testify at the 
scene of the crime. The bill recites that the Court 
was in session at the scene of the crime; that ail 
the officers of the Court, as well as the Jury, the 
defendant and his counsel, and the prosecuting 
attorneys were present. The Bill does not object 
to the Yisit to the scene, but objects to the taking 
of testimony at the scene. The scene \vas visited 
and testimony taken on motion of the State. All 
18 
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of the \vitnesses ,,·ho testified at thP scenP of the 
crime \vith one lPsser exception had already tes-
t i tied in full as State \Vi tnesses in the court room. 
The Court concurred \Yi th the State in the belief 
thn t it \Vas neeessary for a proper understanding 
of thP eviden('P, and that the Jury may have a fair 
nnd better opportunity to pass upon the eredi-
hilitv of ePrtain material \vitnesses, that the Jury 
be p~rmitted to visit the locus of the crime, * * * '' 
The court, in affirming the conYiction, stated: 
•' This Court respectfully believes that it \vas a 
matter of necessity as well as intelligent proced-
ure that witnesses point out to the Jury the pa.r-
tieular part of the automobile to which the evi-
dence adhered; to have the Jury see for them-
selves how well the body of the car had been 
sealed to preserve the evidence in its interior, and 
consequently how genuine was this evidenee to 
have \\·i h1esses show \Yhere, in the interior of the 
car, the fa tal bullet was recovered and other rna te-
rial features of the case so nec.essary for the Jury 
to have accurate knowledge of ... 
~' • • • The purpose of a trial is to ascertain 
the truth. It is impossible to bring the locus into 
the court and introduc.e it in evidence. It is now 
\\·ell reeognized, and there is no dispute herein 
raised to the contrary, that Courts may take the 
jury to Yie\\'" the scene. Upon examination of the 
authorities of the different States, w·e find t\vo 
theories as to \vhether or not a. vie\v of the sc.ene 
constitutes the taking of eYidence. One theory 
holds that a Yie\v of the scene does not constitute 
taking of evidence. The other theory, in our opin-
ion conforming more to reason, is that a view of 
the scene does constitute the taking of eYidence . 
. . . It is only reasonable that, viewing the scene, 
the physical facts and the circumstances sur-
19 
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rounding the scene is as much the taking of eYi-
dence as taking the testimony of 'Yitnesses. A 
view of the scene without explanation might ron-
fuse the jury. Such confusion in many instanrrR 
might operate against the defendant and do him 
great harm. Such confusion may defeat justice. 
The explanation of the locus "~ould enable the jur~· 
to determine the real truth. Neither the State or 
the defendant have any right to complain at in-
jury caused by the truth. Witnesses are permitted 
to dra'Y diagrams of the locus, 'Yhile testifying 
in court, and to testify and explain the locus from 
the diagram and to point out the different objcets 
on the diagram to the jur~~. It does not conform 
to reason to say that you can dra"~ a diagram of 
the locus and explain it "~ith testimony but cannot 
point out the objects at the locus and explain it 
'Yith testimony. It would seem that it "rould be 
better to explain the locus by testimony on the 
scene so that the jury would have a clear under-
standing of all the testimony in the case. It is 
best that the jury c.Iearly understand the case. It 
is to be borne in mind that the average juror has 
had very limited experience in the trial of cases 
and often it is very difficult for them to get a clear 
picture of the locus, the position of the different 
witnesses and objects from a detailed narration of 
the same hv the witnesses. It is better in manY 
., .
instances to aid a jury by taking it to the scene 
and having the scene explained to them in order 
that they 1nay clearly understand it and arriYe at 
the real truth with reference to it. It could not be 
said that an explanation of the scene clarifying 
the testimony given in the trial did not giYe the 
defendant a fair and impartial trial. .A.s a matter 
of fact it 'vould make the trial fairer and more 
impartial. ... \Ve cannot see how it could injure 
the defendant to explain and clarify the seene and 
obtain the truth. 
20 
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•' If it is in the discretion of the Court to per-
mit the jury to view the scene, it is also within the 
discretion of the Court to permit the taking of 
PYidence at the scene to explain it. There is noth-
ing in the record to show any abuse of this dis-
cretion.'' 
Clearly, sound judicial procedures will better serve 
the ends of ascertaining truth so that justice may be done. 
The procedure adopted by the trial court in this instance 
\vas geared toward allowing the jury to fully appreciate 
the testimony previously given. Counsel, the accused, 
the judge, and reporter 'vere present. The proceedings, 
but for the absence of the austere surroundings of a 
courtroom, did no violence to the judicious search for 
truth. Clearly, no prejudice could result or did result 
and no basis for reversal is shown. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S 
~lOTION TO STRIKE OFFICER BURCH'S 
TESTIMONY AS TO CHORD MEASURE-
1\IENTS . 
. A.t the time of trial, Officer William Burch of the 
State Highway Patrol testified that he arrived at the 
scene of the accident 'vithin a few minutes of the acci-
dent (T. 25-27). He marked the position of the over-
turned vehicle ( T. 27), and then a few hours later took 
measurements of the vehicle markings, 'vhich were still 
visible (T. 29). He testified without objection to the 
measurements he made, including the chord mark meas-
urement (T. 31-34). 
21 
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On cross-examination, the defense counsel, using a 
transcript, called the officer's attention to a statement 
he made at preliminary hearing, "Therein he indicated 
that he did not know if he even measured the chord 
mark (T. 139). After that, the follo,ving question ·was 
posed at T. 139: 
"But, now, on redirect examination it is yonr 
testimony -let me rephrase that. On direct ex-
amination you testified as to particular points that 
you measured it from, is that right? 
"That's right." 
Thus, the effect of the cYiclcllrc at this stage \Yas only 
that Officer Burch's testimony may haYc been impeached. 
Thereafter, the record reflects at T. 139: 
''All right. N O\V, then, on redirect examina-
tion, you testified that you got those marks after 
the preliminary hearing by you and Sergeant 
Reid and nir. ~Iason sitting down and discussing 
it, is that right~ 
''We remembered where \YC measured. 
''And yon came up \Yith a mark for purposes of 
this trial, isn't that right, Officer~ 
''That is not right. 
"The three of you discussed it and came up 
\\~ith a mark, isn't that right~ 
'' \\T e remembered \\~here \Yc measured it. 
''After the preliminary hearing~ 
"That's right." 
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HuhsPqU(lntly, counsel made a motion to strike (T. 140). 
'rlu· t rin 1 judge denit'tl the motion to strike, stating ihe 
following reason at T. 1-l-0: 
· ~ • • ~ ~I r. Burns, my thinking on it is this: 
'rhP fart that the officer later discusses the point 
that "·as made at the preliminary hearing and his 
reeollection is refreshed does not prove that it is 
fabrienting anything; and I don't think his testi-
mouy so shows. It may or may not, I 'llleave that up 
to the Jury·; but the fact that he discussed it 'vith 
< )fficrr ~I a son and Officer Reid and between them 
hy discussing this, his recollection is refreshed 
and he testifies \\"ith regard to a certain item 
in this rase doesn't prove that he is fabricating 
anything either now or before. It proves merely 
his testimony is different by reason of the fact that 
his trstimony may be now fabricated - it might 
be fabricated before or it might be truthful on 
both occasions because he didn't recall before and 
he now recalls by virtue of having it refreshed. 
I'm going to overrule and deny your motion and 
lea Ye that point up to the Jury.'' 
X o evidence \Yas offered to sho'v that the evidence, 
in fact, \\·as not the result of Officer Burch's independent 
recollection after discussing the matter 'Yi th other officers. 
Further. his testimony on direct examination 'vas that of 
a "·itness testifying to his o'vn recollection. Therefore, 
at lPast, the evidence presented a question for the jury, 
'vhich is \\"hat the court indicated. 
In Abbott, C'rin1inal Trial Practice, 4th Ed. ~ 353, it 
is stated: 
'~The failure to object to a question before 
answer, if the grounds of objection were then 
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apparent, precludes a subsequent motion to strike 
out the answer." 
Counsel in the instant case had the preliminn ry 
hearing transcript and could haYe tested the "~itness 's 
memory by voire dire2 examination or objected until 
foundation had been laid to show the "\\7itness "~as, in fart, 
testifying from his own memory. Consequently, it is ap-
parent that the motion came too late. 
A motion to strike in the first instance is not a fav-
ored procedure. Abbott, supra, § 352, and the motion is 
usually a matter for the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Thus, in 23A, C.J.S., Crinzinal Lazr, § 1069, p. 45, 
it is noted: 
''The grant or refusal of a motion to strike 
improper evidence may be viewed as a matter 
"\\7ithin the sound discretion of the court, as \Yhere 
the evidence was admitted \Yithout objection, see 
infra § 1070. Thus a motion to strike evidence 
because of facts elirited on cross-examination 
sho\ving it to be incompetent has been held to be 
discretionary \Yith the court.'' 
From the evidence in the instant case, it does not 
clearly appear that the officer had testified apart from his 
own memory. He indicated that the discussions he had 
"~ith the other officers caused him to rec.all the chord 
measurement. The effect of his testimony \Yas properly 
left to the jury to accord it \\~hat \veight they \vould. No 
error ran be claimed on this basis. 
2 A procedure the appellant used numerous times during the trial. 
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POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE AMPLY ESrrABLISHES 
THE APPELLANT'S GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
rrhe appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to 
establish his guilt. It is submitted that there is no merit 
to such a contention. In State v. Berchtold, 11 U. 2d 
208, :~:>7 P. 2d 183 (1960), this court stated with refer-
t1nee to Yie,ving the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 
from a conviction for negligent homicide in violation of 
41-6-4:t10, U.C.A. 1953: 
''We reverse a jury verdict only where we con-
clude from a consideration of all of the evidence 
and the inferences therefrom viewed in the light 
most favorable to such verdict that the findings 
are unreasonable.'' 
Vie,ving the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, it is clear that the evidence is amply suf-
ficient to sustain the conviction. 
The evidence discloses that the appellant drove his 
vehicle up Cedar Canyon at far in excess of the posted 
speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Persons who viewed 
his speed or "~ere riding with him estimated his speed 
as high as 70 miles per hour ( T. 317, 329). The terrain 
'~as a winding, curving, canyon road. The appellant's 
vehicle was specially built for high speeds, so that esti-
mates might reasonably be far less than actual speed, 
and most of the estimates were given by witnesses favor-
able to the appellant. The journey took place at night-
time after the accused had consumed at least four beers 
25 
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and maybe more. Although the appellant may not haYP 
been drunk the consumption of alcohol must haYe had 
some effect on his person, if no more than to relax his 
reeaction time. Thus, in Campbell, Courts and Prosecu-
tors Are the Weak Link in Preventing Drunk D1~i1·iug, 
46 A.B.A.J. 43 (1960), at p. 45, it is stated: 
''The Committee on Medical Aspects of Auto-
mobile Injuries and Deaths of the American Med-
ical Association more recently has published a 
'Medical Guide for Physicians in Determining 
Fitness to Drive a Motor Vehicle.' 'Two 12-oz. 
bottles of 3.2% beer or 2 oz. of 100 proof whiskey 
consumed within one hour will put the average 
moderate drinker in the zone of impaired driving 
ability, i. e., with over 0.035% alcohol in the 
blood ... ' " 
The testimony of the highway patrol experts put 
the speed of the appellant's car at between 99 to 100 
miles per hour, based on over 700 feet of scuff and skid 
marks. At the start of the trip, appellant showed little 
concern for safety by running a stop sign. Appellant, 
immediately after the accident, admitted racing and ac-
cepted guilt for Christine Lambert's death. The evidence 
presented in this case is very, very similar to that before 
the court in State v. Berchtold, 11 U. 2d 208, 357 P. 2d 
183 (1960), where this court found the evidence sufficient 
to convict. In that case, a young girl was also killed 
where the car rolled over on a turn. Clearly, the evi-
dence in the instant case meets the test required under 
the law to convict. 
')C ·~0 
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CONCLUSION 
The instant rase merely aeceHtuates the fact that 
~kill ful counsel can al\\·ays find something to raise on 
appeal. Ho,vever, the record in this case also demon-
~trntP~ an unusually cautious and fair attitude on the part 
of thP trial judge, "·ho appeared to be seeking only the 
truth. The appraisal of the errors claimed, against the 
rPeord as it actually exists, makes it manifest that the 
appellant 'vaR in no 'vay prejudiced except by the truth. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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